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Abstract 
In certificateless cryptography protocol, public keys don't be required certificates to guarantee their 
validity, so any other adversaries can replace users' public keys. There are two security models: the weak 
security model prohibits the adversaries to query the decryption oracle of the ciphertexts under the public 
key chosen by the adversaries, and the more strong security model is asked to correctly answer the 
decryption oracle of this type of ciphertexts. As we well known, almost all certificateless cryptography 
protocols secure in the strong model are at the cost of the efficiency. In this paper, we introduce a new 
definition of secret key awareness security, and we can show a protocol secure in a weak security model 
is also secure in the strong security model, if it satisfies secret key awareness security simultaneously. We 
also give a concrete certificateless scheme secure in the strong security model. 
Keywords: Certificateless Cryptography, Malicious KGC, Strong Attack Model, Non-Black-Box; 
1. Introduction 
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] to 
successfully remove the necessity of certificates and to avoid the key escrow problem inherited in 
identity-based public key cryptography using user-chosen secret information. In a certificateless scheme, 
the user combines two key components to form his private key: one (the partial private key) is generated 
by a key generation center (KGC), and another is derived from his own secret key. Different with 
traditional public key cryptographic protocols, the adversaries are able to replace the public keys of users 
with the ones of their choices, because there are no certificates to authenticate the users' public keys in 
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certificateless public key cryptography. Since the introduction of certificateless public key cryptography 
(CL-PKC), it has undergone quite rapid development, and there were many encryption schemes [1,2,3,4,5] 
and signature schemes [1,6,7,8,9] being proposed. Furthermore, many security models different with the 
model in [1] were introduced, and Dent summarized them [10]. According to the characteristic of CL-
PKC, there are two types of adversaries: one is the Type adversary modeling the outside attackers who 
can replace the users' public keys, obtain partial private keys and private keys, and make decryption 
queries. Another is Type adversary modeling the malicious KGC who is prohibited to replace the users' 
public keys, but can obtain private keys and make decryption queries. For Type adversaries, there are 
two obviously different security models, one model (here we call it weak security model) doesn't allow 
the adversaries to query the decryption oracle of the ciphertexts encrypted by the public keys replaced by 
the adversaries, and in the strong model, the adversaries are permitted to query the decryption oracle of 
the ciphertexts that are encrypted by the public keys replaced by them, and get correct answer. For Type
adversaries, one model assumes that the KGC honestly sets up the system, and another model considers 
that the KGC is malicious from the beginning of the setup of the system, but the protocol secure in this 
model isn't easily proved in the standard model. 
1.1. Related Work 
Libert and Quisquater [5] introduced a generic construction which converted a CLE scheme secure 
against passive adversaries into a scheme secure against strong adversaries using a Fujisaki-Okamoto-
style conversion. This conversion allowed decryption queries to be handled using a form of knowledge 
extraction, but did require the use of a random oracle. Alexander W. Dent presented a generic 
construction for strongly secure CLE [11]. Their construction used any CLE scheme and any normal 
public key encryption scheme as components, and they didn't require the use of random oracles. Instead, 
they used an extension of the techniques of  Naor-Yung and Sahai, but the generic construction cannot be 
regarded as being practical because of the using of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for general 
statements in NP. 
1.2. Our Contributions 
We firstly introduce a new security notion called secret key awareness (SA) security in certificateless 
cryptography, and this security notion requires any adversary replacing the users' public keys must know 
the corresponding secret keys. It is to say, there is a key extractor which can obtain the secret keys given 
the adversaries transcripts as input. We can show that a certificateless public key scheme secure in the 
weak security model can be proved secure in the strong security model, if the scheme simultaneously 
satisfies the secret key awareness security.  
Secondly, we make the certificateless encryption scheme [13] more efficient by avoiding the zero-
knowledge proof, and we prove it is secure in the strong security model.  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Certificateless Public Key Encryption 
Definition 1. (Certificateless Public Key Encryption)}. A generic certificateless public key encryption 
scheme consists of the following seven algorithms: 
( )SetUp SU : a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm run by a key generation center (KGC) 
given a security parameter k  as input which outputs a randomly chosen master secret key msk  and 
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master public key mpk . The master public key mpk  includes a description of the message space M  and 
ciphertext space C .
( )PartialPrivateKeyExtract PPKE : given the master public key mpk , master secret key msk  and 
an identifier AID  for entity A , the KGC runs this PPT algorithm to generate the partial private key Ad .
Then the partial private key Ad  is transported to entity A  over a confidential and authentic channel. 
( )SetSecretValue SSV : a PPT algorithm run by the entity A given master public key mpk  and AID
as inputs which outputs a secret value Ax .
( )SetPrivateKey SPVK : given master public key mpk , the entity 'A s secret value Ax , and the 
entity 'A s partial private key Ad  as input, the entity runs this PPT algorithm to generate a private 
key ASK .
( )SetPublicKey SPK : given master public key mpk  and the entity A 's secret value Ax , and output a 
public key APK  for the entity A .
( )Encrypt E : given a plaintext M M , master public key mpk , an identifier AID and public key 
APK  for an entity A  as inputs, a sender runs this PPT algorithm to create a ciphertext CC  or the null 
symbol A  indicating an encryption failure. This will always occur in the event that APK  does not have 
the correct form. 
( )Decrypt D : given master public key mpk , the entity's private key ASK , and the ciphertext CC
as inputs, the entity as a recipient runs this deterministic algorithm to get a decryptionV , which is either a 
plaintext message or a ``reject`` message. 
3. Secret Key Awareness Security 
3.1. Definition
( ).Definition2 Secret Key Awareness Security SKA Let ( , , , , , , )SU PPKE SSV SPVK SPK3  E D
be a certificateless encryption scheme, let B  be a Type adversary who has access to an oracle and can 
replace the users' public keys, and returns nothing. Let K  be an algorithm that takes the user's public key 
and some state information, and returns the corresponding secret key and a new state. We call B  a public 
key creator and K a private key-extractor. For k ` , We say that certificateless encryption scheme 3
satisfies the secret key awareness security in the following experiment if for every polynomial-time 
public key creator B , there exists a polynomial-time private key-extractor K such that 
, , , ,( ) [ ( ) 1]
SA SAAdv k Pr Exp k3 3  B K B K  is negligible. 
Experiment , , ( )
SAExp k3 B K
( , ) (1 ); ( , );k A Ampk msk SU d PPKE mpk IDm m
Choose coins [ ], [ ]R RB K  for ,B K , respectively; [ ] (( , ), [ ])ASt mpk ID RmK B
Run B on input ( , )Ampk ID  and coins [ ]R B  until it halts, replying to its oracle queries as follows: 
-If B  makes query ( , )mpk PK  then 
( , [ ] [( , ), [( )]; [( )]x St mpk PK St RmK K K K
If x  isn't the secret key corresponding with PK  then return 1. 
Else return x  to B  as the reply.  
End If return 0 
From the above definition, the knowledge extractor is non-black-box, and allows the extractor code to 
depend non-uniformly on the code of the public key creator. Again, this was done in order to increase the 
possibility of finding constructions. Evidence of the power of non-black-box formulations is provided in 
another context by [12]. Intuitively, the secret key awareness security is to guarantee anyone generating 
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the public key to know the corresponding secret key. In order to obtain this kind of security, there are two 
usual technology, one is the non-interactive zero knowledge proof system to prove the possession of the 
secret key, and the knowledge extractor can extract corresponding knowledge by revising the adversaries 
replacing the users' public key, but the existence of the non-interactive zero-knowledge greatly reduces 
the efficiency of schemes. Another makes use of a non-black-box reduction model, in which the 
knowledge extractor can get the code of the adversary, and [ ]R B  includes the random choice of the 
adversaries, and certainly can extract the corresponding secret key. 
3.2. Result
1.Theorem If a certificateless encryption scheme 3  with secret key awareness security is secure 
against the chosen ciphertext attack in the weak model, then it is secure against the chosen ciphertext 
attack in the strong model. 
:Proof  For contradiction, we begin with an IND-CCA2-adversary 1 2( , )A A A  in the strong model 
with a non-negligible advantage, 2, ( )
ind cca
AAdv k

3 against 3 . In addition, we know there is a secret key 
extractor K , with high probability of success, , , ( , , [ ])
SKA
BAdv mpk pk R3K B , for any adversary B who
replaces the users' public key. Using A  and K  we construct an IND-CCA2-adversary 1 2( , )A A Ac c c  in 
the weak model with a non-negligible advantage, 2, ( )
ind cca
AAdv k

c 3  against 3 .The adversary is defined 
as follows: 
1( , , )AlgorithmA mpk pk Rc
Take 1R  from R
Run 1 1( , , )A mpk pk R , When 1A  makes its jth  query ( , )pk yc  to :PPkD
1Ac checks whether pk pk c ,
If so, 1Acmakes decryption oracle y  to obtain x , answer 1A  with x .
Else, run ( , , )sk TS pk mpkc cm K , 1Ac  makes decryption oracle ( , )y sk c  to obtain x ,
Answer 1A  with x .
Finally 1A  halts, outputting 0 1( , )x x , return 0 1( , )x x
2 0 1( , , , )AlgorithmA x x y Rc
Take 2R  from R
Run 2 0 1 2( , , , )A x x y R .
When 2A  makes its jth  query ( , )pk yc c  to :PPkD
2Ac checks whether pk pk c ,
if so, 2Ac makes decryption oracle yc  to obtain xc , answer 2A  with xc .
Else, run ( , , )sk TS pk mpkc cm K . 2Ac  makes decryption oracle ( , )y skc c  to obtain xc , answer 2A
with xc .
Finally 2A  halts, outputting bit b , return b .
Now, by the above definition, we can see: 
2 2
, , ,, ( ) ( ) ( , , ).
ind cca ind cca SKA
A BAAdv k Adv k Adv mpk pk TS
 
c 3 33 t  K
The proof is completed. 
4. Concrete Certificateless Encryption Scheme 
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We modify the scheme in [13]  and make it more efficient by avoiding the non-interactive zero-
knowledge. 
4.1. the Construction 
Let G  and TG  be groups of order p , and let : Te G G Gu o  be a bilinear map. 
( )kSetUp :The KGC picks random generators 1 2 3, , ,g h h h G  and a random 
*
pZD   and 
computes 1g g G
D  . The KGC then chooses a hash function H  from a family of universal one-way 
hash functions. The master public key is 1 1 2 3( , , , , , , , , ),Tmpk G G e H g g h h h  and the master secret key is 
.msk D 
( )mpkSetSecretKey : Pick px Z  at random and return the user secret key sk x .
( , )mpk skSetPublicKey : Compute 1 2 1( , ) ( , )
x x
IDPK pk pk g h   and publish it.. 
( , , , )IDmpk ID PK mskPartialPrivateKeyExtract : Pick 1 2 3, , pr r r Z  and compute 
1 11/ 1/,1 2 1( ) ( )
r rID x ID
IDh pk g h g
D D    , 1/, ( ) , ( 2,3).i
r ID
ID i ih h g i
D   
Return ,( , , 1, 2,3)ID i ID id r h i  
( , )IDsk dSetPrivateKey : Set 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 ,1 2 ,2 3 ,3( , , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , , , , , , ).ID ID ID ID IDSK s s s s s s s sk d x r h r h r h   
( , , , )IDmpk ID m PKEncrypt : To encrypt the message Tm G , parse 1 2 1( , ) ( , )
x x
IDPK pk pk g h  ,
check that it has the right format by verifying the equality 1 1 2( , ) ( , )e pk h e pk g . If so, choose 
*
ps Z
and compute 
0 1 2 3 1 2 2 31( , , , ) ( , ( , ) , ( , ) , ( , ) ( , ) ),
s IDs s s s sC C C C C g g e g g m e pk pk e g h e g h E   
where 0 1 2( , , , , ).IDH C C C ID PKE  
( , , ) IDDecrypt C mpk SK : Parse C  as 0 1 2 3( , , , )C C C C and the private key IDSK
as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7( , , , , , , )s s s s s s s . Compute 0 1 2( , , , , )IDH C C C ID PKE   and check whether 
4 6
3 0 5 7 1( , ) .
s sC e C s s C EE   Reject C  if the equality does not hold. Otherwise, return 
2 12 0 3 1( ( , ) ) .
s sm C e C s C 
4.2. Security Ananlysis 
2.Theorem The certificateless encryption scheme is secure against the Type in strong security 
model attacker in the standard model if the Decisional Truncated q-ABDHE Assumption and 1DHK
Assumption hold for ( , , )TG G e .
Proof: Limited from the space, we omit the proof.  
638   Guoyan Zhang /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  10 ( 2011 )  633 – 639 
5. Conclusion 
This paper firstly introduce a new secure notion called secret key awareness security in certificateless 
cryptography, this secure notion requires any adversary replacing the users' public keys must know the 
corresponding secret keys. Then it can be shown that a certificateless public key scheme secure in the 
weak security model can be proved secure in the more strong security model, if the scheme 
simultaneously satisfies the secret key awareness security. Secondly, it makes the certificateless 
encryption scheme [13] more efficient by avoiding the zero-knowledge proof, and  proves it is secure in 
the more strong security model. 
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